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PREVIEW; McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.: How Far 
Does Sovereign Immunity Extend? 
Remy J. Orrantia* 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will hear oral argument 
on this matter Friday, October 25 at 9:00 a.m. in the Second Floor 
Courtroom of The Pioneer Courthouse in Portland, Oregon. 
Torrance L. Coburn will appear on behalf of the Appellant, Martin 
S. King will appear on behalf of the Appellee, and John Harrison 
will appear on behalf of the Intervenor-Appellee. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case presents the issue of whether a tribal college, 
incorporated under the laws of the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes (“Tribe”) and, subsequently, the State of Montana, 
may be considered an arm of the Tribe, thus benefitting from tribal 
sovereign immunity. The resolution of this issue will influence tribal 
jurisdictional questions throughout the state and the country. The 
Appellant, Stephen McCoy, asserts that the federal courts have 
federal question jurisdiction over his Title VII claims against 
Appellee, Salish Kootenai College, Inc. (“College”) because it is not 
an arm of the Tribe and therefore is not immune from Title VII 
claims.1 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The College was originally chartered and incorporated under 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal law in 1977, and shortly 
thereafter, in 1978, it was incorporated under Montana law.2 
Stephen McCoy began his 23-year employment with the College in 
1992 and served in several capacities over that period.3 McCoy 
claims that he was subjected to a hostile work environment which 
 
* Remy J. Orrantia, J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III School 
of Law at the University of Montana. 
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5–6, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 
(9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (No. 18-35729). 
2 Appellee’s Answering Brief at 9–11, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 
(9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2019) (No. 18-35729). 
3 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3. 
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culminated with his resignation in December 2016.4 Beginning in 
November 2014, McCoy claims he was subjected to multiple 
allegations and insinuations that he made improper romantic 
advances towards personnel of entities the College conducts 
business with; he was removed from two coordinator positions he 
held; and he was improperly disciplined.5  
After resigning, McCoy filed his complaint with the 
Montana Human Rights Bureau and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and subsequently received  notice of his 
right to file an action in district court.6 The subsequent complaint 
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, 
Missoula Division, alleges sex-based discrimination under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act and the Montana Human Rights Act.7  
The College moved for jurisdictional discovery to determine 
if the federal court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the 
case and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted.8 After extensive briefing, the district court granted the 
College’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the College was an 
arm of the Tribe and shared its sovereign immunity under the five-
factor test established in White v. University of California.9 McCoy 
has appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
the Tribe have stepped in as an intervening party. 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Indian tribal sovereignty has a long and storied history in the 
United States.10 The courts have long viewed Indian tribes as 
 
4 Id.  
5 Complaint at 3, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., (D. Mont. June 26, 
2017) (CV 17-88-M-DLC). 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 Id. at 4–5. 
8 Salish Kootenai College’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai 
College, Inc., (D. Mont. Feb. 2, 2018) (CV 17-88-M-DLC). 
9 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). 
10 Dating to the original treaties entered into by the British Monarchy and the 
colonial Indian tribes they interacted with. See, e.g. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. 515, 544 (1832) (holding that the United States had succeeded all political 
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“domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent authority over 
their members and territories,”11 and that sovereign authority and 
immunity extend beyond merely governmental activities, covering 
business activities of a tribe as well.12 Modern jurisprudence has 
evolved to establish a test as to whether an entity may share in a 
tribe’s sovereign immunity because it is conducting business as an 
arm of the tribe.13 
The White test, adopted from the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, presents five factors to be weighed in determining whether 
the entity is sufficiently intertwined with the tribe so as to share its 
sovereign immunity.14 The factors to be weighed are: (1) the method 
of creation of the entity; (2) the entity’s purpose; (3) the entity’s 
structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of 
control the tribe has over the entity; (4) the tribe’s intent to share its 
sovereign immunity with the entity; and (5) the financial 
relationship between the tribe and the entity.15 The totality of 
McCoy’s claims depend on whether he can show that the College 
fails to meet the White factors, overcoming the district court’s 
finding that the College is acting as an arm of the Tribe and that its 
activities can be properly viewed as those of the Tribe.16 On appeal, 
the Court will review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction de novo.17 
 
 
and territorial claims of Great Britain, including treaties with Native American 
tribes recognizing them as sovereign entities). 
11 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 
505, 509 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
13 White v. University of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (establishing 
the five-factor “arm of the tribe” test). 
14 Breakthrough Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 
F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010). 
15 White, 765 F.3d at 1025. 
16 Allen, 464 F.3d at 1046. 
17 Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
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A. Appellant’s Argument 
McCoy argues that none of the White factors weigh in favor 
of the College being an arm of the Tribe. 18 McCoy argues under the 
first White factor, that the law under which the entity is formed is a 
strong determinative factor in establishing whether an entity should 
be treated as an arm of an Indian tribe, and an entity being formed 
under the laws of a state weighs against that factor. 19 McCoy hones 
in on the fact that the College’s Articles of Incorporation themselves 
state that the incorporators acted both as citizens of the United States 
and of the state of Montana.20 McCoy also distinguishes the 
incorporation under state law from the College’s incorporation 
under Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal law. He claims that 
the College—as incorporated under Montana law—is a separate and 
distinct entity from the College as incorporated under tribal law.21 
He supports this by noting that the College’s Montana Articles of 
Incorporation do not mention tribal law or reserve any rights to the 
Tribe, while the tribal Articles of Incorporation state that the entity 
may only be sued in tribal court.22 McCoy argues that these 
distinctions strongly weigh against finding that the College is an arm 
of the Tribe.  
McCoy argues that the purpose of the College is not for the 
benefit of the Tribe. He states that the College’s Articles of 
Incorporation state that it was not created for the financial benefit of 
the Tribe, nor was it established to aid in tribal self-governance.23 
He argues that, contrarily, the College was created to benefit a 
greater geographic location, the Flathead Indian Reservation, which 
is home to a significant amount of people who are non-native or not 
enrolled members of the Tribe.24 He supports these notions with the 
 
18 See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8-28. 
19 Id. at 9 (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Chapa De Indian Health 
Program, 316 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. Miami Nation Enters., 
386 P.3d 357, 372 (Cal. 2016)). 
20 Id. at 10. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 11. 
23 Id. at 14. 
24 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15. 
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fact that less than 30% of the College’s employees are tribal 
members, and, at most, 28% of the enrolled student body is affiliated 
with the Tribe.25  
Finally, McCoy also contends that the Tribe’s lack of control 
based on the structure, ownership, and management of the College 
shows that it is not an arm of the Tribe. McCoy again draws the 
distinction between the Montana corporation and the Tribal 
corporation, noting that the College, as a completely distinct legal 
entity from the tribally incorporated entity, grants no control to the 
Tribe through either the formal governance structure or through 
control of day-to-day activities.26 He argues not only that there is a 
lack of control by the Tribe, but also that the College’s Articles of 
Incorporation show no intent to share tribal sovereignty. He claims 
this omission puts the College beyond tribal control and establishes 
the College as a separate entity, not acting as an arm of the Tribe.27  
Consequently, it does not enjoy sovereign immunity.  
B. Appellee and Intervenor-Appellee’s Arguments 
Both the Tribe and the College (collectively “Appellees”) 
advance the same arguments, essentially, that the College meets all 
aspects of the White test. The Appellees counter McCoy’s main 
argument that the College is a Montana entity separate from the 
tribally incorporated entity with the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in other 
suits that have been lodged against the College.28 The Appellee’s 
contend that these cases completely refute the separate entity theory 
presented by McCoy. They note that the Montana Supreme Court 
has recognized that a single tribal entity can be dually incorporated 
under state and tribal law,29 and that, contrary to McCoy’s assertion, 
 
25 Id. at 15 (citing the College’s Annual Report, ER Vol. 2, 136–51). 
26 Id. at 18–19. 
27 Id. at 21. 
28 Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 2, at 7–8 (citing Smith v. Salish 
Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Smith v. Salish 
Kootenai Coll., CV-02-00055-M-LBE, 2003 WL 24831272, (D. Mont. Mar. 7, 
2003); Cain v. Salish Kootenai Coll., Inc., CV-12-181-M-BMM, 2018 WL 
2272792, (D. Mont. May 17, 2018)). 
29 Id. at 8 (citing Flat Ctr. Farms, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 49 P.3d 578 (Mont. 
2002)). 
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dual incorporation of a tribal entity does not cause the entity to lose 
its tribal status.30 Appellees insist that the court should not follow 
McCoy’s narrow view of incorporation, but rather, they must view 
the College as one entity based on the state and tribal Articles of 
Incorporation, Bylaws, Policies, and the College’s tribal charter.31 
The Appellees further argue that the College is an important arm 
of the Tribe and finding otherwise would devastate the College 
while potentially depriving the Tribe and the people of the Flathead 
Reservation from their sole source of post-secondary education.32 
The Appellees argue that the potential ramifications of finding the 
College to be a non-Indian entity include a flood of litigation which 
would be financially ruinous to the College, and the loss of key 
federal funding.33 
The Appellees also focus on the control issue under the 
White test. The College establishes its qualification as a “tribally 
controlled college” under the Tribally Controlled Colleges and 
Universities Act, which requires that a tribally controlled college 
must be chartered by the governing body of an Indian tribe.34 The 
Appellees argue that McCoy’s interpretation of White would require 
pervasive Tribal Council control and management of the College. 
This requirement would adversely affect the recognized tribal 
interest that a tribe may govern through entities other than formal 
tribal leadership.35 The College emphasizes the critical financial 
relationship the Tribe plays in obtaining funding;36 the Tribe’s intent 
 
30 Id. (citing Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Mont., Inc., 68 
P.3d 814 (Mont. 2003). 
31 Id. at 9. 
32 See generally Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 2; Intervenor-Appellee 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering Brief (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 
2019) (No. 18-35729). 
33 Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering 
Brief at 12 (specifically referring to the College’s funding under the Tribal 
College Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.). 
34 Id. at 13. 
35 Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering 
Brief, supra note 32, at 13–14 (citing Smith, 434 F.3d at 1133). 
36 Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 2, at 40–41. 
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for the College to share its sovereign immunity;37 and the inability 
of the College to waive its sovereign immunity; among other 
arguments adverse to McCoy’s narrow interpretation of the White 
factors.38 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Incorporation Under State Law and its Effect on Tribal 
Sovereignty   
 McCoy puts significant weight on the fact that the College 
is incorporated under the laws of Montana, but the College argues 
that incorporation under state law is possible while retaining its 
tribal status. The district court disagreed with McCoy’s 
interpretation on this matter, citing Smith.39 Smith dealt with a 
similar position advanced by McCoy here and against the same 
entity.40 However, the holding in Smith does not provide an adequate 
answer to the question of tribal sovereignty, it merely drew upon 
several cases discussing sovereign immunity.41 The distinction 
made in Cain42 directed the court to address the “arm of the tribe” 
analysis under the White factors, and a subsequent non-precedential 
decision in that case by the district court dismissed the action in 
accordance with the White factors, notably ruling that the method of 
incorporation supported the College’s sovereign immunity claim.43 
 The Court must determine whether the method of creation 
does, in fact, follow the district court’s interpretation in Cain, or if 
 
37 Id. at 35. 
38 Id. at 35–36 (citing United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai Coll. Inc., 
862 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that waiver of sovereign immunity is 
irrelevant when a statute does not apply to the Tribes in the first place)). 
39 Order at 6, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai Coll., Inc., (D. Mont. August 10, 2018) 
(CV-17-88-M-DLC); 434 F.3d at 1134. 
40 434 F.3d at 1134–35 (affirming the Tribal Court of Appeals and the district 
court’s findings that the College is a tribal entity or an arm of the tribe). 
41 United States ex rel. Cain, 862 F.3d at 943–944 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of 
Okla. v. Mfg Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760) (discussing the difference in 
application of sovereign immunity to suits in the sovereign’s own courts versus 
suits in the courts of another sovereign). 
42 Id. 
43 Memorandum and Order at 3–4, Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., (D. 
Mont. May 17, 2018) (CV 12-181-M-BMM). 
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it instead will adopt McCoy’s separate entity interpretation. 
Precedent dictates the likely answer will be a finding for the College. 
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state incorporation of a 
tribally incorporated entity will not divest the tribal corporation of 
its tribal status as McCoy suggests.44 Dual incorporation does not 
divest a tribal corporation of its tribal status, and, moreover, the 
Tribe’s Tribal Council originally chartered and established the 
College under the authority of the Indian Reorganization Act45 and 
the Tribe’s Constitution.46 The Court will likely not follow a narrow 
interpretation of the White factors, but rather view the College as a 
dually incorporated entity, satisfying the first White factor. 
B. Control and Other Crucial Factors 
 The Tribe expressed significant concern about the 
implications of requiring the Tribal Council to integrate themselves 
into the College’s governance as well as controlling day-to-day 
activities.47 Instead, the amount of control required is not such a 
rigid and definite structure.48 The Court will consider all relevant 
factors of control, and even if the College had completely 
outsourced its management to a nontribal third party, that alone is 
not enough to shift the weight against sovereign immunity.49 
However, if the Tribe neglects their governance role or fails to 
exercise any control or oversight, acting merely as passive owners, 
then the control factor would subsequently weigh against 
immunity.50 That is not the case here though, where the Tribe plays 
an active role in the governance of the College while maintaining 
the balance of autonomy required to keep its accreditation.51 
 
44 Smith, 434 F.3d at 1129; Allen, 464 F.3d at 1044. 
45 25 U.S.C. § 476. 
46 Order, supra note 38, at 6. 
47 Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering 
Brief, supra note 32, at 13–15. 
48 See Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 
922 (6th Cir. 2009). 
49 Miami, 386 P.3d at 373. 
50 Id.  
51 Order, supra note 38, at 9. 
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 The Tribe adamantly protests that the College is much more 
than an unrelated, arm’s length entity located on the Flathead 
Reservation.52 Under the White test, the purpose of the College is 
scrutinized to determine whether it was created for the benefit of the 
Tribe or for some other purpose. The purpose is viewed in light of 
whether the incorporators were acting in the best interest of the Tribe 
when they created the entity.53 The Appellees’ argument that the 
College is an integral part of protecting the Tribe’s culture and 
history, while also providing invaluable educational resources to 
member and non-member Indians, will also likely weigh in favor of 
the College being a closely related arm of the Tribe and thus 
protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The delicate balance that exists in federal Indian law cannot 
be subject to narrow, non-inclusive interpretations of precedent 
established to protect the sovereignty of Indian tribes over their 
members, entities, and territories. In the decades preceding this case, 
the College has had its sovereign status challenged on more than one 
occasion. The courts have thus far refused to lift the protective veil 
of sovereign immunity from the College and allow it to be sued 
outside of tribal courts. So, while McCoy’s claims deserve equal 
treatment under the law, they must be brought in a court with proper 
jurisdiction.  
 
52 Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering 
Brief, supra note 32, at 6. 
53 Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1192. 
